LINGUIST List 13.1632

Sun Jun 9 2002

Review: Philosophy of Lang, Semantics: Lycan (2001)

Message 1: Lycan (2001) Real Conditionals

From: Anne Reboul <reboul@isc.cnrs.fr>

Subject: Lycan (2001) Real Conditionals

Lycan, William G. (2001) Real Conditionals. Oxford UniversityPress, 223pp, hardback ISBN 0-19-924207-0
	
Anne Reboul, Institute for Cognitive Sciences, CNRS, France
	
[This book has not yet been announced on Linguist List.]
	
GENERAL PRESENTATIONThis very interesting book is a must for anyone, whether alinguist or a philosopher, interested in conditionals andconditional reasoning. However, it is a very compact book,suitable only for well-informed readers. It should on noaccount be taken for a text book or introductory work.

LINGUIST List 13.1632

Sun Jun 9 2002

Review: Philosophy of Lang, Semantics: Lycan (2001)

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1. Anne Reboul, Lycan (2001) Real Conditionals

From: Anne Reboul <reboul@isc.cnrs.fr>

Subject: Lycan (2001) Real Conditionals

Lycan, William G. (2001) Real Conditionals. Oxford UniversityPress, 223pp, hardback ISBN 0-19-924207-0
	
Anne Reboul, Institute for Cognitive Sciences, CNRS, France
	
[This book has not yet been announced on Linguist List.]
	
GENERAL PRESENTATIONThis very interesting book is a must for anyone, whether alinguist or a philosopher, interested in conditionals andconditional reasoning. However, it is a very compact book,suitable only for well-informed readers. It should on noaccount be taken for a text book or introductory work.
	
SYNOPSISThe book is made of eight fairly homogeneous chapters with anappendix on "non-conditional conditionals". Its aim is to givea truth-conditional account of conditionals avoiding the(mainly linguistic and syntactic) pitfalls in which most"logical" accounts of conditionals fall and keeping some ofthe virtues of the non-truth-conditional account known as theRamsay Test.
	
It thus opens, unsurprisingly, with a chapter devoted to "TheSyntax of Conditional Sentences". This begins with an attackagainst the general logical view of conditionals, according towhich a conditional involves a "syntactically unstructuredbinary sentence operator" (1), i.e. "if… then". This is truewhether "if…then" is taken as equivalent to the materialimplication or to the intensional or modal operator. This leadlogicians to treat "If A, then B", "B if A" and "A only if B"as equivalent. This, Lycan claims, is wrong, for syntacticconsiderations. Though conditionals are generally defined assentences with the connective "if", other adverbials such as"in case", "in the event that", etc. are semantically verysimilar and any theory of conditionals should take them intoaccount. Other sentences, generally considered as logicallyequivalent to conditionals (e.g. some disjunctions) aresyntactically quite different from them. Lycan proposes toconsider as conditional any sentence in which "if" occurs andany sentence which is synonymous with, not merely logicallyequivalent with, such sentences. Finally, Lycan rejects theidea that conditionals are unstructured conjunctions, showingthat conditional sentences exhibit syntactic propertiesradically different from conjunctions (e.g. neitherconjunction reduction, gapping, across-the-board principleapply to conditionals). Neither are conditionals unstructuredsubordinating conjunction: they can be modified by "even" and"only". Indeed, the proximity of "if" with "when" and "where"seems to indicate that conditional clauses are adverbial,making "tacit reference to events and circumstances" (11).Finally, Lycan rejects, for syntactic reasons, the idea that"unless" is equivalent to "if not". Again, a Relative-Clauseaccount should apply to "unless", as it applies to "if",though in the case of "unless", it undergoes a twist: thenegation applies indeed, but not in the scope of "unless";rather it applies on the quantification over the eventsdescribed in the clause.
	
The second chapter, "Truth Conditions: The Event Theory", isdevoted to a description of Lycan’s theory of conditionals. Itis the longest chapter in the book and is indeed pivotal. Thetheory is a semantic theory in the sense that it intends topropose a systematic assignment of truth-conditions tosentences with "if", "unless", "only if" and "even if". Thisis supposed to account for the implications of such sentences,to explain the dependence of their truth-values on context andto agree with their syntactic properties. Lycan proposes thefollowing paraphrases of such sentences: "P if Q — P in anyevent in which Q"; "P only if Q — P in no event other than onein which Q"; "P even if Q — P in any event including any inwhich Q"; "P unless Q — P in any event other than one in whichQ". All of these formulas involve universal quantificationover a domain of events in which Q. Event is here to be takenas situation, in a sense similar to that of situation theory.
	
Formalizations of the paraphrases express the truth-conditionsof the corresponding sentences. The universal quantifiersshould be restricted to a reference class of "realpossibilities", i.e. possibilities which "the utterer musthave (…) at least tacitly in mind as a live prospect" (19).The reference class, however, should contain only "relevant"properties, which leads Lycan to a discussion of semifactualsand "weak" conditionals. A second problem is that the utterermight be wrong about possibilities. A solution to the firstproblem (the relevance of events) is to restrict the referenceclass to events where either P, non-P, Q or non-Q is true(Moderate Relevance Restriction) or to restrict it to eventswhere either P or non-P is true (Strict RelevanceRestriction). Both of these conditions probably apply todifferent classes of conditionals. The reference class is thus"a hidden parameter that will vary with context" (23). Thesecond difficulty is more serious. A way out is to see that"with the inclusion or non-inclusion of all actual relevantevent in R [the reference class], stands or falls the validityof Modus Ponens" (24). Lycan postpones the issue till chapter3. Lycan’s theory (henceafter the "Event theory") does notmeet with the syntactic objections outlined in the firstchapter against the unstructured-sentential-operator theoryand has quite a few semantic benefits, among which avoidanceof the paradoxes of material implication, accomodation (withsome suplementation) of Stalnaker invalidities (antecedent-strengthening and transitivity), contraposition, semi-factualsand weak conditionals, explanation of the direction ofconditionship, parametric differences between apparentequivalents, simplification of disjunctive antecedents andimpossible antecedents.
	
The third chapter, "Truth Conditions: Reality and ModusPonens", returns to the problem left aside in chapter 2. Itcritically examines the three major essays in the refoundationof conditional investigation, i.e. Adams (1965), Stalnaker(1968) and Lewis (1973). As Lycan points out, two differentmajor paradigms emerged from these essays: the first one (fromAdams) in terms of an epistemic assertibility semantics (non-truth-conditional); the second one (Stalnaker and Lewis) interms of a possible worlds truth-conditional semantics. BothAdams’ and Stalnaker’s accounts stem from Ramsey’s test.Ramsey’s test consists in adding the antecedent hypotheticallyto one’s present set of beliefs, revising this set wherenecessary, and checking whether the consequent is part of therevised set of belief. If it is, the conditional isassertible, if not, it is not. Adams translated it in terms ofconditional probability relative to one’s belief set,considering that indicative conditionals are restricted toepistemic assertibility and do not have truth-values. He saidnothing of subjunctive conditionals. Stalnaker recasted RamseyTest in terms of alternative possible worls with a selectionfunction based on similarity. Conditionals would be evaluatedby checking whether C holds in the world most similar to ourswhere A holds. Notably, Stalnaker defends this as a truth-conditional account of conditionals which he afterward adaptedfor subjunctive conditionals. Lewis rejected the notion of auniquely nearest world with the accompanying acceptance ofConditional Excluded Middle. He replaced it with the notion ofcomparative similarity. Lewis’ account was criticized for itsreliance on an intuitive notion of overall similarity, througha number of counterexamples. He responded by discarding theeveryday notion of similarity and advocating a brand ofsimilarity specific to counterfactuals, though he was notspecific about it. This is deeply unsatisfactory as noted byLycan. The Ramsey Test is not immune from counterexampleseither, though they mostly center on the relativity toepistemic situations it introduces. There are alsocounterexamples to the proximity between the Ramsey Test(taken to establish truth-value and not mere assertibility)and Similarity Theory, based on the fact that the two accountsdo not always yield the same results. Notably, some exemplesexamined through the Ramsey Test will contradict Modus Ponens.This might be taken as an indication of the worthlessness ofthe Ramsey Test in establishing truth-value. This would leadto the choice of restricting the Reference class to ALL actualrelevant events, whether or not they are envisaged or not (theReality Requirement). However, Lycan points out that ModusPonens does raise more problems than it solves, notablyrelative to Sobel sequences (i.e. "if A then C" may be falseeventhough "If A and B then C" and "A and B" are true). Thisproblem does not arise for Similarity accounts. However, itdoes for Ramsey Test accounts. In the Event Theory, which canbe seen as a "mixed view", "If A then C" and "If A and B thenC" can be true. Lycan, after discussing a few objections,turns to further counterexemples against Modus Ponens. Onequestion which the Event Theory has to face is whether thereference class shifts when iteration or Sobel sequences areinvolved in the antecedent. Lycan’s answer is clearlypositive: this entails given up Modus Ponens as valid becauseof its FORM.
	
In the previous two chapters, Lycan had described the twogreat trends in approaching conditionals: the non-truth-valued(NTV) view and the truth-valued (TV) view. Though his approachtries to keep some of the advantages of the Ramsey Test, it isclearly TV. The fourth chapter, "In defense of Truth Value",offers some arguments for TV and counter-arguments for NTV.Lycan begins by listing arguments against NTV: itsphilosophical peculiarity; its linguistic bizareness; the factthat conditional speech acts suppose sincerity and truth; themany parallels between indicatives and subjunctives which makeit hard to claim that, for instance, only indicatives wouldhave truth-values; the possibility of embedding conditionalsin longer sentences, where assertibility can play no role;their dependence on nomologicals, which goes against NTV; theproblem of deductive validity for deduction involvingconditionals; the problem of modals; and, finally, the problemwith deflationism (which implies that conditionals should havetruth-values). Lycan then shows that the Event Theory cananswer all the problems which NTV answers without giving uptruth-values. He now turns to what he calls the new horseshoetheory (NHT), which tries to make conditionals equivalent tomaterial implication and to answers the numerous problems thisraises. His criticisms of NHT are based on the claims thatindicative conditionals are not restricted to the actual, thatthe material implication leads to a clearly invalid inferencepattern (from "not(if A then b)" to "A", "not-C"), and that itcannot explain the validity of some clearly valid entailments.
	
Lycan then turns to "A beautiful but false theory of ‘evenif’". He begins by claiming that "even" in "even if" meansjust… "even". He distinguishes three views about "even", giventhat "even" strongly implies a contradiction of contextualpresumptions: the minimal view, according to which "even"contributes nothing to the semantics of the sentence; theconventional view, where the unexpectedness is supposed to bea conventional (though non-truth-conditional) implicature; thesemantic view, in which "even" does have a truth-conditionalcontribution to make. The last one is the one favoured byLycan, who defends the view that "even" expresses "acomparison of expectedness with a contextually indicatedreference-class" (100). The specificity of "even if" is thatthe meaning of a sentence where it occurs does not seemconditional anymore. This leaves the role of the antecedentopen. The situation is however slightly more complicated,given that the consequent may be entailed or not depending onfocus phenomena. Thus some "even if" conditionals entail theirconsequent, while others do not. In fact, the Event Theoryanswers these questions, and also answers the pragmaticquestion of why the utterer asserts "Q even if P" where "Q"might seem sufficient. This leaves two questions unanswered:the place of focus in the theory and the defence of thesemantic view of "even". This leads Lycan back to his beginingassumptions and to show that they can account for focus:notably the idea that "even" adds to conditionals both thewidening of the reference class and a universal quantificationover all its members. There are, however two differentclasses, the comparison class of conditions attached to the"even if" conditionals and the reference class of realcircumstances attached to the corresponding "bare"conditionals. Though the second is often a subclass of thefirst, it is not always the case. This leads to areformulation of the original formulation for "C even if A",where A is explicitly included in the comparison class. Thisleaves Lycan with the defense of the semantic view of "evenif", for which he gives three arguments: the rarity ofsemantically empty words in natural languages; evidence forthe fact that "even if" involves universal quantification; thelinguistic similarity between "even" and "only", which are"syntactic soulmates" (112) and "logical contraries" (113).
	
Lycan then turns to counterexamples to that theory which leadhim to "An Unbeautiful but less easily refutable theory of‘Even If’".He begins with four apparent counterexamples to thetheory, which drive him to definetively drop both the RealityRequirement and Modus Ponens. There is a more seriousobjection to the universal quantifier theory of "even" andthat is that "even" seems to allow of exceptions (e.g. "I’lleat anything on pizza, even squid or bull’s testicles, but nota brick or a crowbar"). This is the problem of the contrastwithin the reference class. Weakening the quantifier to a lessthan universal reading ("many" for instance) would not howeverbe satisfying. A way of preserving the universal analysis isto consider the comparison class as encompassing everything"within reason". This however seems rather ad hoc. Another wayof saving the universal hypothesis is to take "even" asmeaning not "every…including…" but "every… plus…". This meansthat the Consequent-Entailment problem fades away: on thisanalysis, "Q even if P" does not entail "Q", though theassertion of "Q even if P" does most often amount to anassertion of "Q", notably when the reference class is asubclass of the comparison class.
	
Lycan then turns to "The ‘indicative’/'Subjunctive’distinction". Despite the great similarities betweenindicative and subjunctive conditionals, there are some caseswhere the indicatives and the corresponding subjunctivesdiffer in truth-values. Lycan begins by noting that thedifference is not a matter of grammatical moods and that theterminology is, therefore, ill-chosen. He substitutes to it"straight" and "boxarrow" conditionals, noting that some so-called indicative conditionals are not conditionals at all andshould be treated independently. After a reminder of sometheories of conditionals (Adams, Lewis, Stalnaker, etc.), heturns to the distinction in the event theory. This turns outto be, quite simply,a difference in reference classes,indicated through "lexical presumption". This means that astraight conditional and its boxarrow counterpart share theirlogical forms but differ in the the values their parameterstake, and thus in truth-values. More precisely, a conditionalis straight when its utterer holds fixed a salient fact in hisepistemic field, while it is boxarrow if the utterer neglectscontextual facts and considers a wider range of possibilities.The Law of Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM) fails forboxarrows and, according to Lycan it also fails for straights.Finally, the straight/boxarrow distinction does not seem toapply to future conditionals.
	
Finally, Lycan turns to a well-known example, "The RiverboatPuzzle" in which (Simple version) a henchman signals to one ofplayers what the cards of the other player are, then leaves.He utters two conditionals, one straight, one boxarrow. In theanomalous version, a second henchman, better informed (he hasseen the hands of both players), utters conditionals with thesame antecedents but the opposing consequents. Consideringonly the straight versions, it is claimed that they are bothtrue and that it seems that the law of ConditionalNoncontradiction does not hold. This has been used to arguefor NTV. Lycan counterargues that in fact the first henchman’sconditional is a backtracker, evaluated by holding fixed thepresent actual fact which is the most jarring relative to thecounterfactual and adjusting other facts to make thecounterfactual true. Backtrackers are not incompatible withordinary conditionals and hence the law of conditionalnoncontradiction is not violated.
	
There are two appendixes to the book, the first one conjointlywritten by Lycan and Geis and the second one by Lycan alone,both on Nonconditional Conditionals (NCCs). In the first one,Geis and Lycan begin by justifying the claim that someapparently conditional sentences are not, in fact, conditional(e.g. Austin’s example: "There are biscuits on the sideboardif you want them") by showing that they do not satisfy a listof syntactic, semantic or pragmatic features which are typicalof conditionals. This raises two questions: what is thefunction of antecedents of non-conditional conditionals andhow is it that non-conditional conditionals are interpreted assuch, without any need for disambiguation from bona fideconditionals? A tentative answer to the first question is thatconsequents are indeed what is asserted in NCCs, whileantecedents articulate some "felicity condition" of theconsequent assertion, though sincerity conditions areexcluded. This raises a new question. Why should this beexpressed through a "phony antecedent adverbial"? Anothertentative answer to that new question is that the antecedentsof NCCs, as the antecedents of bona fide conditionals, makeexplicit possibilities. Geis and Lycan then lists some lessobvious types of NCCs which form a continuum but makes it evenless easy to link NCCs with regular conditionals. In thesecond appendix, Lycan comes back to the problem of thesemantics of NCCs, suggesting that NCCs could be accomodatedin the Event Theory if the reference class is taken to includeno non-Q event. This answers the third and fourth of thequeries above, the second one being tackled through pragmaticconsiderations. Lycan’s pragmatic answer is that NCCantecedents are metalinguistic and thus clearly not bearing aconditional relation to the consequent, which excludes NCCsbeing perceived as ambiguous.
	
CRITICAL EVALUATIONLycan began his career as a philosopher of language, hasbecome best known in the past few years as a philosopher ofmind and this book comes as a reminder that he still is aforemost philosopher of language. Lycan’s book is extremelyinteresting and seems quite successful in combining theinsights of both the Ramsey Test and Similarity Theory in aunified truth-conditional theory of conditionals. It alsoseems to take satisfactorily into account the syntacticfeatures so often neglected by logicians. It does not eschewthe difficulty which non-conditional conditionals have put inthe path of semantic theories of conditionals. The book isthus well worth reading and indeed should, I think, be read byanyone interested in the subject.
	
However, I want to insist on the fact that the book is clearlynot for beginners: extended knowledge of the field is needed.It should also be said that it is a comparatively short book(210 pages, including the appendixes) and that it has a highlevel of content, making for a rather dense, though quiteclear, book. I think it might have been easier to read of ithad been some fifty pages longer. However, it is a must forany one interested in conditionals and conditional reasoning.
	
REFERENCESAdams, E.W. (1965), "The logic of conditionals", INQUIRY 8,166-197.
	
Lewis, D. (1973), Counterfactuals, Cambridge, Mass., HarvardUniversity Press.
	
Stalnaker, R. (1968), "A theory of conditionals", in N.Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford, Blackwell.
	
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHAnne Reboul is a First Class Research Fellow at the FrenchCenter for Scientific Research (CNRS) in France. She has aPh.D. in Linguistics (EHESS, Paris) and a Ph.D. in philosophy(University of Geneva, Switzerland). She has written somebooks, among which an Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Pragmaticsand quite a few papers in French and English, on pragmaticsand/or philosophic subjects.

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